| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Independent | WATCH Prior 97.9% 70808793100 | Executive in Residence at General Catalyst since 2018. |
Independent | HEALTHY Prior 99.4% 70808793100 | Senior Vice President and Chair of IBM Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia Pacific since 2023. |
Independent | HEALTHY Prior 93.6% 70808793100 | Chairman and CEO of Financial Guaranty Insurance Company from 1992 to 2001, and served as a director at Exelon Corporation. |
Independent | ELEVATED Prior 96.6% 70808793100 | Miller Boise has extensive experience in business strategy and governance, particularly in the global manufacturing sector, including semiconductors and automotive industries. |
Independent | HEALTHY Prior 99.5% 70808793100 | George is the Chief Financial Officer of Norfolk Southern since November 2019, previously serving as CFO at Otis Elevator Company and Carrier Corporation. |
Independent | MATERIAL Prior 99.4% 70808793100 | Hayes served as CEO of Ball Corporation from 2011 to April 2022, leading multiple acquisitions that doubled revenues and increased market capitalization sixfold. |
Independent | HEALTHY Prior 98.7% 70808793100 | Former CEO of CRH plc from 2009 to 2013, with prior directorships at Babcock International Group plc and UDG Healthcare plc. |
Independent | HEALTHY Prior 99.6% 70808793100 | Pine has served as president and CEO of Xylem Inc. since January 2024 and previously held leadership roles at United Technologies Corporation, Vestas Wind Systems, and Lennox International Inc. |
Not independent | MATERIAL Prior 90.2% 70808793100 | David S. Regnery has been CEO since July 2021 and Chair since January 2022, with a long tenure at the Company overseeing global operations. |
Independent | ELEVATED Prior 99.5% 70808793100 | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. |
Independent | ELEVATED Prior 92.4% 70808793100 | Chairman and CEO of United States Steel Corporation from 2004 to 2013. |
| #1 | Election of 11 directors for a period of one year Filed by the board · Board recommends For Elect 11 nominees to the Company’s Board of Directors to serve for one year until the 2027 Annual General Meeting. |
| #2 | Advisory approval of the compensation of the Company’s Named Executive Officers Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding advisory vote (Say-on-Pay) to approve the compensation of the Company’s Named Executive Officers as disclosed in the CD&A, compensation tables, and related proxy disclosures. Detail ›This management proposal asks shareholders to cast a non-binding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive pay program for its Named Executive Officers as described in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and related tables. Management and the Human Resources and Compensation Committee (HRCC) argue the program strongly links pay to performance through a mix of base salary, an annual cash Annual Incentive Matrix (AIM) tied to Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA and Cash Flow with a Sustainability Modifier, and long-term incentives (stock options, RSUs and Performance Share Units) tied to CROIC and relative TSR. The Board highlights prior shareholder support (~90% in 2025) and emphasizes governance features such as significant performance-based pay, clawback policies, share ownership requirements, and use of an independent compensation consultant. A vote FOR would signal shareholder endorsement of the HRCC’s design choices, including sustainability integration into incentives and the specific mix and caps described. The vote is advisory and non-binding, but the Board commits to consider the outcome and engage with shareholders on feedback. Key risk considerations include potential shareholder concerns about pay levels, the scope of discretion retained by the HRCC for adjustments, and extensive use of equity and performance metrics that could deliver large payouts if targets are exceeded. The company's disclosure of prior outcomes, payout mechanics, and the +2% Sustainability Modifier for 2025 provides context for assessing the appropriateness of pay-for-performance alignment. Given the Board’s rationale and recent strong shareholder support, management recommends FOR, but shareholders should evaluate the detailed CD&A and pay tables to judge alignment with long-term value creation. |
| #3 | Approval of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as independent auditors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Approve PwC as the Company’s independent auditors for the fiscal year ending and authorize the Audit Committee to set the auditors’ remuneration. |
| #4 | Renewal of the Directors’ existing authority to issue shares Filed by the board · Board recommends For Authorize the Board to allot relevant securities up to approximately 20% of issued ordinary share capital for 18 months, as required under Irish law. Detail ›This management proposal seeks shareholder renewal of the Board’s authority under Irish law to allot up to approximately 20% of the Company’s issued ordinary share capital over an 18-month period. Management frames the request as routine and necessary to preserve corporate flexibility for equity compensation, funding acquisitions, and raising capital, while noting that it is not asking to increase authorized share capital but only to use existing authorized shares. The filing emphasizes that NYSE rules and SEC protections remain in place—e.g., shareholder approval is still generally required for issuances representing 20% or more of voting power or for change-of-control or related-party transactions—mitigating dilution risk. The resolution text specifies the aggregate nominal amount ($48,923,517) and incorporates customary provisos allowing allotments under offers made before expiration. Governance and investor concerns to consider include potential dilution from future issuances and how management will use the authority; however, the Board’s explicit commitment to market practices and prior similar approvals reduces the likelihood of opportunistic use. For investors, the key mitigants are the limited 20% cap, the 18‑month duration, and the Company’s disclosure of intended uses (employee compensation and potential acquisitions). The Board recommends FOR given the routine nature of the authorization and its role in enabling standard corporate financing and compensation activities in Ireland. Active shareholders may nonetheless monitor any large share issuances for timing and strategic justification. |
| #5 | Renewal of the Directors’ existing authority to issue shares for cash without first offering shares to existing shareholders (Special Resolution Filed by the board · Board recommends For Special resolution to empower the Directors, subject to Item 4, to allot equity securities for cash without offering them pro rata to existing shareholders (opt-out of statutory pre-emption), limited to up to 20% of issued ordinary share capital and certain rights issues, for 18 months. Detail ›This special management proposal requests shareholder approval under Irish law to disapply pre-emption rights so the Board may issue shares for cash without first offering them pro rata to existing shareholders, subject to limits and for an 18‑month period. The request is split into two parts: (a) preserve rights issues in favor of existing shareholders on a proportional basis (with customary exclusions), and (b) permit other cash issues up to ~20% of issued capital — mirroring the ordinary authority sought in Item 4 — allowing the Company to use shares for compensation plans, acquisitions and capital raising without procedural delay. Management frames this as routine market practice in Ireland and consistent with NYSE and U.S. standards; however, because it directly affects pre-emption protections, it requires a 75% majority under Irish law. The governance trade-off is between preserving management flexibility versus protecting existing shareholders from dilution and opportunistic issuances; the 20% cap, time limit and requirement for special resolution are key constraints. Active investors should weigh the Company’s capital allocation history, prior share issuance behavior, and stated likely uses (compensation and potential strategic transactions) when considering support. The Board’s recommendation FOR is supported by the need to maintain competitiveness with non-Irish NYSE-listed peers and ensure timely execution of transactions, but shareholders may seek additional safeguards (e.g., pre-commitment to limited issuance in RFPs or clearer disclosure on issuance purposes). Given the routine nature in the Irish market and the specified limits, the Board believes the authorization is appropriate and recommends approval. |
| #6 | Determine the price range at which the Company can reallot shares that it holds as treasury shares (Special Resolution Filed by the board · Board recommends For Special resolution to authorize the price range for reallotting treasury shares: maximum 120% of market price and minimum nominal value (for employee schemes) or 95% of market price for other cases, with 18-month expiry. Detail ›This special resolution asks shareholders to approve the price parameters at which the Company may reallot treasury shares over the next 18 months, establishing a maximum of 120% and a minimum of either nominal value (for employee scheme obligations) or 95% of the market price for other reallotments, where market price is defined as the NYSE closing price on the day before reallotment. Management argues the authorization is procedural and required by Irish law to permit the Company to reissue treasury shares for compensation programs and other corporate needs at market-appropriate prices. From a governance perspective, the floor at 95% and the cap at 120% constrain potential opportunistic reallotments and preserve a degree of market fairness, while allowing the Company to price issuances competitively to meet strategic needs. Employee-plan related re-issues at nominal value are standard and intended to satisfy plan obligations that would otherwise be difficult to execute. The special resolution requires a 75% affirmative vote under Irish law, reflecting its significance. Shareholders should consider the Company’s recent buyback and treasury practices, the potential dilution impact of future reallotments, and whether the specified price band is consistent with shareholder interests. The Board recommends FOR given the routine nature of the request, the limited duration, and the policy that any reallotments will be made at prices the Board considers in shareholders’ best interests. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 6.51% | $5.99B |
| STATE STREET CORP | 4.57% | $4.21B |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 3.38% | $3.12B |
| FMR LLC | 3.05% | $2.81B |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 2.11% | $1.94B |
| GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.03% | $1.86B |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 1.60% | $1.47B |
| MORGAN STANLEY | 1.32% | $1.21B |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 1.22% | $1.13B |
| WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT GROUP LLP | 1.00% | $921M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
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