| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Independent | — | Isaac Angel served as CEO from 2014 to 2020 and has held chairman roles at Gilat Satellite Networks and LeadCom Integrated Solutions. |
Independent | — | Barniv served as chairperson of Tnuva Group from 2013 to 2015 and held board positions at Clalit Health Care and Shikun & Binui Ltd. |
Independent | — | Karin Corfee has over three decades of experience in the energy sector and is the founder and CEO of KC Strategies LLC since April 2021. |
Independent | — | David Granot is currently Chairman of M.L.R.N. Projects and Trading Ltd. and serves on the board of CLAL Insurance Enterprises Holdings Ltd. |
Independent | — | Michal Marom co-founded Linkury Ltd. and served as its CFO, and has held directorships at Ayalon Insurance, Paz Energy, and ISROTEL, with prior roles at Union Bank of Israel and Halman Aldubi. |
Independent | — | Dafna Sharir has served on the board of directors of Gilat Satellite Networks since 2016 and Cognyte Software since 2022, with prior board roles at Frutarom Industries and Ormat Industries. |
Independent | — | Stern is the Managing Partner of Alnitak Capital and has served as a director for Audiocodes, Radware, and Tigo Energy since 2012, 2020, and 2015, respectively. |
Independent | — | Senior Vice President of Commercial Development (Asia) at Chevron Global Power Company from 2001 to 2012, managing independent power projects and overseeing geothermal development in Indonesia and the Philippines. |
| #1 | Election of Directors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Elect eight director nominees (Isaac Angel, Ravit Barniv, Karin Corfee, David Granot, Michal Marom, Dafna Sharir, Stanley B. Stern, and Byron G. Wong) to serve one-year terms expiring at the 2027 Annual Meeting. |
| #2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation paid to the Company’s named executive officers as disclosed in the proxy (CD&A, compensation tables and related narrative). Detail ›This management proposal asks shareholders to cast a non-binding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation as disclosed in the proxy statement. Management seeks this annual affirmation to validate its pay-for-performance philosophy, which uses a mix of salary, annual cash bonuses tied to Company and individual metrics (revenue, adjusted EBITDA and specific operational targets), and long-term equity awards consisting of PSUs (50% relative TSR, 50% megawatt capacity growth) and RSUs. The Compensation Committee emphasizes a heavy weighting toward at‑risk and multi‑year incentives to align executives’ interests with long‑term value creation and retention. The proxy explains that PSUs vest subject to three‑year performance periods with caps (including a TSR cap if absolute TSR is negative) and MW targets intended to drive organic capacity growth; RSUs provide service-based retention. Management notes engagement with major stockholders and that prior say‑on‑pay received strong support (~86% in 2025), which it uses as evidence that the program is broadly acceptable to investors. The Board recommends a FOR vote, arguing that the program balances short‑term operational accountability with long‑term shareholder alignment, is benchmarked to market practices, and includes governance safeguards (independent committee oversight, independent compensation consultant, clawback policy, anti‑hedging/pledging rules). Potential shareholder concerns could include the complexity and disclosure of MW targets (not disclosed prospectively for competitive reasons) and the use of relative TSR versus absolute performance; management counters that disclosing MW targets prospectively would cause competitive harm and that the mix of TSR and MW metrics mitigates single‑metric risk. Overall, the proposal is framed as a routine advisory mechanism for shareholders to express views on compensation, with management presenting both quantitative results (revenue and adjusted EBITDA achievement) and qualitative CEO goals as justification for recommended payouts. |
| #3 | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm Filed by the board · Board recommends For Ratify the appointment of Kesselman & Kesselman, a member firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PwC), as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm for fiscal 2026. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| BlackRock, Inc. | 8.66% | $595M |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.88% | $336M |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.27% | $294M |
| STATE STREET CORP | 3.97% | $273M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 3.23% | $222M |
| Clal Insurance Enterprises Holdings Ltd | 3.13% | $215M |
| Global Alpha Capital Management Ltd. | 2.92% | $200M |
| DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS LP | 2.89% | $199M |
| CANADA PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT BOARD | 2.59% | $178M |
| GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 2.51% | $172M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
« Back to Shareholder Meeting Calendar
Frequently Asked Questions
Last updated: