| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Independent | ELEVATED Prior 96.5% 70808793100 | Co-Founder and Executive Chairman of Confluence Resources LP, and former CEO of Western Gas Resources, Inc. during its merger with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. |
Independent | CRISIS Prior 81.9% 70808793100 | W. Howard Keenan, Jr. has served as a director of Antero Resources since 2004 and was a director of AMGP from February 2014 to March 2019. |
Independent | ELEVATED Prior 96.8% 70808793100 | Founder and CEO of Apex Strategies, LLC, and former Senior Vice President at Apache Corporation, with over 30 years of experience in the oil and gas industry. |
| #1 | Election of Class I Directors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Vote to elect the three nominated Class I directors (Peter A. Dea, W. Howard Keenan, Jr., and Janine J. McArdle) to serve three-year terms expiring in 2029. |
| #2 | Ratification of Selection of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm Filed by the board · Board recommends For Vote to ratify the Audit Committee and Board’s selection of KPMG LLP as Antero Midstream’s independent registered public accounting firm for the year ending . |
| #3 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation of Antero Midstream’s named executive officers for 2025 as disclosed in the proxy statement. Detail ›This management-backed, non-binding say-on-pay proposal asks shareholders to approve the total compensation paid to Antero Midstream’s named executive officers for 2025 as disclosed in the proxy materials. Management seeks approval to affirm its compensation design, which for 2025 consisted of a mix of base salary, a performance-weighted annual cash incentive (metrics: free cash flow after dividends, net debt/EBITDA, ROIC, and an ESG qualitative assessment), and long-term equity (75% time-based RSUs and 25% ROIC-based PSUs). The Compensation Committee cites strong Company performance in 2025 (including higher cash flow, declining leverage, share repurchases and operational metrics) and a 200% payout under the annual incentive as evidence the program functioned as intended. The Board recommends a “FOR” vote on the grounds that pay is market-referenced, majority at-risk, tied to multi-year performance metrics (including ROIC) and includes stock ownership guidelines and clawback provisions to align management and shareholder interests. Risks include concentrated equity awards to senior executives and the discretionary elements (e.g., retroactive adjustment to Ms. Schultz’s target bonus) that may raise governance or pay-for-performance questions for some investors. The non-binding nature of the vote means the Board retains discretion, but it will consider the outcome and investor feedback when setting future compensation. For an analyst evaluating governance and compensation structure, key matters to monitor are continuing alignment of incentive metrics with long-term value creation, transparency around discretionary adjustments, and realized payouts versus peer outcomes. Given the Board’s unanimous recommendation, robust disclosure and the program’s link to multi-year ROIC and ESG metrics, management positions this proposal as a reaffirmation of its compensation philosophy and practices. |
| #4 | Advisory Vote on Frequency of Future Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Frequency Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding, advisory vote for shareholders to indicate whether future advisory votes on executive compensation should be held every 1, 2, or 3 years (or abstain); the Board recommends an annual (1 year) vote. Detail ›This management proposal asks shareholders, on a non-binding basis, to indicate the preferred frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation by choosing among one, two or three years (or abstaining). The Board supports an annual vote, arguing that yearly say-on-pay votes allow shareholders to provide timely feedback on compensation policies, maintain an ongoing dialogue, and better align executive pay disclosure with evolving governance expectations. Management frames the annual frequency as consistent with its active investor outreach and ongoing adjustments to compensation practices (e.g., incorporation of ROIC and ESG metrics, adoption of a clawback policy, and recent changes to severance and other governance policies). Opponents of annual votes typically argue that more frequent votes can increase administrative burden and short-term pressure on boards; proponents say annual votes improve accountability and responsiveness. The company emphasizes the advisory nature of the vote — the Board will consider results but retains final authority — and that the choice will not change existing compensation arrangements by itself. For governance analysts, relevant context includes prior say-on-pay support levels (approximately 89% in 2025), the Board’s recent governance enhancements, and the company’s emphasis on shareholder engagement; these factors make the Board’s recommended annual frequency a logical default. The Board’s unanimous recommendation for a 1-year frequency reflects a preference for continuous shareholder feedback and signals confidence that its compensation program will withstand annual review. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| BlackRock, Inc. | 4.40% | $477M |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 3.85% | $417M |
| Invesco Ltd. | 3.38% | $366M |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 3.12% | $338M |
| STATE STREET CORP | 2.44% | $264M |
| TORTOISE CAPITAL ADVISORS, L.L.C. | 2.35% | $254M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 2.11% | $229M |
| GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | 1.82% | $197M |
| DIMENSIONAL FUND ADVISORS LP | 1.75% | $190M |
| Neuberger Berman Group LLC | 1.53% | $166M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
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Frequently Asked Questions
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