| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Not independent | NO PRIOR VOTE First-time nominee · forecast uses baseline rate | Sanjay Gajendra is a co-founder of Astera Labs and has served as Chief Operating Officer since November 2017, and President since November 2023. |
Independent | MATERIAL First-time at this board · prior vote history at other boards | Dr. Barratt was President and CEO of Atheros Communications until its 2011 acquisition by Qualcomm and served as Senior Vice President at Intel until May 2020. |
Independent | CRISIS First-time at this board · prior vote history at other boards | Michael Hurlston is the President and CEO of Lumentum Holdings Inc. since February 2025 and has been on Astera Labs' board since November 2022. |
| #1 | Election of Class II Directors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Election of three Class II directors—Sanjay Gajendra, Craig Barratt and Michael Hurlston—to serve three-year terms ending at the 2029 annual meeting. |
| #2 | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm Filed by the board · Board recommends For Ratify the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Astera Labs’ independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending . |
| #3 | Advisory Vote to Approve the Compensation of Our NEOs (Say-on-Pay Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed in the CD&A, executive compensation tables and related narrative disclosure. Detail ›This management proposal asks holders to cast a non-binding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation as disclosed in the proxy, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, compensation tables and related narrative. Management seeks this advisory approval to validate its pay decisions, demonstrate alignment with stockholder interests, and to inform the compensation committee’s future actions; the board emphasizes that the outcome will be carefully considered though it is not binding. The proposal is contextualized by the Company’s compensation philosophy—heavy emphasis on equity awards, material at-risk compensation, and metrics designed to link pay to performance (notably revenue and Non-GAAP operating margin for annual cash incentives). The compensation program for 2025 featured substantial RSU awards for certain NEOs, cash bonuses that paid out at 180.586% of target based on corporate performance, and planned introduction of performance-based RSUs beginning in 2026 to strengthen alignment. Supporters would argue the program appropriately balances short-term financial incentives with long-term equity-based alignment and retention mechanisms, while critics may point to large equity grant values and single-year performance metrics as potential over-reliance on stock price and retrospective pay outcomes. The board’s recommendation for a “FOR” vote is justified by management’s view that pay outcomes track company performance, the use of market benchmarking and an independent compensation consultant, and governance features such as clawback policies, stock ownership guidelines, and double-trigger change-in-control vesting. Because the vote is advisory, a strong against vote would still be non-binding but would be a clear signal prompting the compensation committee to reassess program design, metrics, and disclosures. Overall, the proposal centers on confirming investor support for the mix and outcomes of the Company’s executive pay practices amid rapid growth and significant equity-based compensation, and the board frames its recommendation around alignment with long-term stockholder value creation. |
| #4 | Advisory Vote on the Frequency of Future Say-on-Pay Votes Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding advisory vote to select whether future advisory votes on executive compensation (Say-on-Pay) should occur every one year, two years, or three years; the board recommends a frequency of one year. Detail ›This management-sponsored, non-binding proposal asks stockholders to choose how often they wish to cast advisory Say-on-Pay votes—every one, two, or three years—with the alternative receiving the plurality of votes treated as the stockholder-selected frequency. Management is seeking this input to align governance practices with investor preferences and to comply with SEC requirements that the company periodically solicit frequency guidance; while non-binding, the board commits to consider and be guided by the plurality outcome. The board explicitly recommends an annual vote (one year), citing prevailing market practice and stockholder expectations for regular engagement on executive pay. An annual frequency increases opportunities for investors to express views on pay-for-performance and provides a recurrent governance checkpoint, but it can also increase administrative burden and may encourage short-term signaling. Conversely, multi-year frequencies (two- or three-year) reduce administrative costs and may allow compensation programs more time to take effect before being judged, but they reduce the immediacy of investor feedback. The board’s recommendation reflects a judgment that frequent engagement better aligns with current investor norms and facilitates quicker responsiveness to compensation outcomes, particularly given the Company’s rapid growth and evolving compensation program (including planned PSUs). Because the vote is advisory, the board will weigh the plurality result and investor feedback in its ongoing compensation governance, and a strong preference for a non-annual frequency would likely prompt discussions about the trade-offs between engagement frequency and program stability. Overall, the proposal is a governance mechanism to calibrate the cadence of investor oversight over executive pay and to reconcile operational considerations with investor expectations. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| FMR LLC | 12.18% | $2.29B |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.26% | $801M |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 3.70% | $695M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 3.41% | $641M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 2.07% | $390M |
| Atreides Management, LP | 1.96% | $369M |
| FMR LLC | 1.95% | $366M |
| STATE STREET CORP | 1.94% | $365M |
| FRED ALGER MANAGEMENT, LLC | 1.50% | $282M |
| ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN L.P. | 1.47% | $418M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
« Back to Shareholder Meeting Calendar
Frequently Asked Questions
Last updated: