| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Independent | CRISIS Prior 75.9% 70808793100 | Dr. Berthelsen served as Chairman of the board of directors at Kelsey Seybold Clinic from October 2001 through April 2016 and has been a director of Ionis since May 2002. |
Independent | MATERIAL Prior 95.9% 70808793100 | Joan E. Herman has served as President and CEO of Herman & Associates since 2008 and held executive roles at Elevance, including CEO of various business units. |
| #1 | Election of Directors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Elect Spencer R. Berthelsen and Joan E. Herman as directors for three‑year terms expiring at the 2029 Annual Meeting. |
| #2 | Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation Filed by the board · Board recommends For Nonbinding advisory vote to approve the compensation of the named executive officers as disclosed in the Proxy Statement (a 'say-on-pay' vote). Detail ›This proposal asks stockholders to cast a nonbinding advisory vote approving the Company’s executive compensation disclosures (the "say-on-pay" vote). Management presents this as an overall endorsement of the named executive officers’ pay as described in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis and the Summary Compensation Table. Ionis frames its program as pay-for-performance with a significant portion of senior executives’ compensation tied to performance (MBO cash bonuses, stock options, and PRSUs), minimum vesting periods, stock ownership guidelines, a clawback policy, and limits on repricing. The Company highlights strong 2025 operating execution — including two independent product launches, revenue and cash performance, and a high Company Performance Factor of 190% — as context for the recommendation. Because the vote is advisory, it does not itself change compensation arrangements, but a substantial negative vote would trigger the Board and Compensation Committee to evaluate stockholder concerns and consider changes. Governance context: Ionis conducts annual say‑on‑pay votes and uses an independent compensation consultant and peer benchmarking; the Board therefore recommends support to affirm its compensation strategy. From a stewardship perspective, investors evaluate this proposal to assess whether the disclosed pay practices meaningfully align with company performance, dilution controls, and long‑term value creation; management highlights recent changes (e.g., increased PRSU weighting, minimum vesting, clawbacks) to strengthen alignment. A vote FOR signals acceptance of the Board’s approach, while a vote AGAINST would indicate significant shareholder concerns that could prompt further dialogue or program changes. |
| #3 | Approval of an Amendment of the Amended and Restated Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2011 Equity Incentive Plan Filed by the board · Board recommends For Request to approve amendment to the 2011 Equity Incentive Plan to increase the aggregate share reserve by 9,500,000 shares, raising the total authorized under the plan to 52,000,000 shares. Detail ›This proposal asks shareholders to authorize an increase of 9.5 million shares to the Company’s primary equity incentive plan, raising the 2011 Plan reserve to 52 million shares. Management’s stated rationale is operational: with limited remaining shares (approximately 2.6 million as of ) and an ongoing equity budget to support hiring, promotions, and retention, the Company argues it needs the expanded reserve to continue competitive annual grants and to avoid impairing recruiting and retention. The board emphasizes governance protections in the plan — e.g., fungible share counting (1.0 for options, 1.7 for full‑value awards granted after ), no automatic evergreen, limits on repricing or cash‑outs without shareholder approval, minimum vesting rules, and Compensation Committee administration — to mitigate dilution and misuse risk. The Company reports an average annual grant burn below peers (about 2.36% vs. 3.4% peer average) and that the requested increase supports its merit budget and long‑term compensation strategy. Approval requires a majority of votes cast under Nasdaq rules; abstentions and broker non‑votes will not affect the outcome. Key investor considerations include dilution impact versus retention/competition needs, the plan’s anti‑repricing and vesting safeguards, recent grant history and equity burn, and the Compensation Committee’s oversight. If approved, management will have flexibility to continue structured equity grants; if rejected, the Company warns it could harm its ability to recruit and retain talent and execute its commercial and R&D plans. |
| #4 | Approval of an Amendment of the Amended and Restated 2000 Employee Stock Purchase Plan Filed by the board · Board recommends For Request to approve amendment to the 2000 ESPP to increase the share reserve by 750,000 shares and remove the plan termination date (making the plan effectively open‑ended). Detail ›This proposal seeks shareholder approval to add 750,000 shares to the ESPP and to remove the plan’s termination date, effectively allowing the ESPP to continue beyond its prior expiration. Management frames the ESPP as a broad‑based tool to attract, retain and reward employees by enabling payroll‑deducted purchases at an 85% discount (based on offering and purchase date pricing), subject to contribution limits and a six‑month holding period. The Company notes only ~130,884 shares remained as of and believes that without replenishment the plan may be insufficient to meet recruiting and retention needs before the 2027 annual meeting. Governance safeguards include shareholder approval for material amendments, eligibility limitations (hours and tenure), limits on annual participation per employee, and Section 423 tax‑qualified structure. Investor considerations include modest dilution from the requested shares versus the value of broad employee alignment, the absence of an evergreen provision historically, and the operational importance of the ESPP in retention and ownership culture. Approval requires a majority of votes cast under Nasdaq rules; abstentions and broker non‑votes will not affect the outcome. If approved, the Company retains an active ESPP to support employee ownership; if not approved, the ESPP will face constrained capacity that may pressure recruiting/retention and require other compensation adjustments. |
| #5 | Ratification of Selection of Independent Auditors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Ratify the Audit Committee’s selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Ionis’ independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year 2026. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| Capital World Investors | 12.82% | $1.59B |
| FMR LLC | 8.19% | $1.02B |
| FMR LLC | 6.66% | $827M |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.73% | $586M |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 4.31% | $535M |
| T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. | 3.73% | $462M |
| WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT GROUP LLP | 3.56% | $441M |
| TWO SIGMA INVESTMENTS, LP | 3.54% | $440M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 2.72% | $338M |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 2.57% | $319M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
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