| Nominee | Forecast | Background |
|---|---|---|
Not independent | ELEVATED First-time at this board · Non-independent director on the Compensation Committee | Long Wan served as CEO of WH Group from October 2013 to August 2021 and has been Chairman of Shuanghui Development since August 2012. Governance flag: Non-independent director on the Compensation Committee |
Not independent | ELEVATED First-time at this board · Non-independent director on the Compensation Committee | Hank He played a key role in the post-acquisition transition of the company after its acquisition by WH Group in 2013. Governance flag: Non-independent director on the Compensation Committee |
Independent | NO PRIOR VOTE First-time nominee · forecast uses baseline rate | Raymond A. Starling served as Chief of Staff to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and as a principal agriculture advisor to the President of the United States. |
| #1 | Election of Directors Filed by the board · Board recommends For Election of three Class II director nominees—Long Wan, Hank Shenghua He and Raymond A. Starling—to serve three-year terms expiring at the 2029 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. |
| #2 | Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm Filed by the board · Board recommends For Ratify the Audit Committee’s selection of Ernst & Young LLP as Smithfield Foods’ independent registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending . |
| #3 | Advisory Vote on Approval of the Compensation of the Named Executive Officers (Say-on-Pay Filed by the board · Board recommends For Non-binding, advisory vote to approve the compensation paid to the Company’s named executive officers for fiscal year 2025 as disclosed in the proxy statement. Detail ›This advisory "say-on-pay" proposal asks shareholders to approve the Company’s overall executive compensation program as disclosed in the proxy statement for fiscal year 2025. Management seeks shareholder approval to validate its design: a mix of base salary, significant performance-based annual incentives (paid 70% cash / 30% restricted stock units plus 10% in stock options), and post-IPO equity awards intended to align executive interests with long‑term shareholder value. The Compensation Committee and Board state that targets were set to motivate strong Normalized Net Income and other segment and volume metrics, with discretion to adjust payouts for individual performance or extraordinary events. The program aims to balance short-term operational incentives and long-term equity-based alignment while remaining competitive to attract and retain senior talent in the industry. The vote is non-binding but management will consider the outcome when making future compensation decisions and the Board recommends a "FOR" vote, arguing the program is reasonable, competitive and aligned with performance. Key context: the Company completed an IPO in January 2025, adopted a new omnibus incentive plan, and continues to transition compensation governance from its prior WH Group oversight to a Compensation Committee-led process with an external consultant. Potential governance considerations include that the Company qualifies as a controlled company (WH Group owns a majority) which affects committee composition, and that certain performance targets are not disclosed because of competitive sensitivity. A sophisticated evaluation should weigh the program’s heavy performance orientation (target-level bonuses characterized as "strong performance"), the significant pension and severance benefits disclosed, the post-IPO equity grants and their vesting schedules, and the Compensation Committee’s retained discretion to adjust outcomes. Given these factors, shareholders voting on merit should consider whether the disclosed metrics and governance safeguards sufficiently tie pay to sustainable shareholder value and whether disclosure of competitively sensitive targets limits shareholders’ ability to fully assess pay‑for‑performance alignment. |
| Holder | % of shares | Position value |
|---|---|---|
| TWO SIGMA INVESTMENTS, LP | 1.07% | $118M |
| LSV ASSET MANAGEMENT | 0.58% | $64M |
| MORGAN STANLEY | 0.45% | $49M |
| FMR LLC | 0.43% | $48M |
| JACOBS LEVY EQUITY MANAGEMENT, INC | 0.37% | $41M |
| Qube Research Technologies Ltd | 0.33% | $37M |
| Fourth Sail Capital LP | 0.28% | $31M |
| AQR CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 0.28% | $31M |
| MILLENNIUM MANAGEMENT LLC | 0.28% | $31M |
| FMR LLC | 0.26% | $29M |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › | |
| Annual report (10-K) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Quarterly report (10-Q) | View › | |
| Definitive proxy (DEF 14A) | View › |
About the risk forecast
The risk forecast scores each director on the company’s slate against Boardroom Alpha’s YoY Director-Vote Forecast model — three XGBoost classifiers that estimate the probability the director’s vote support falls below 70%, 80%, and 90% at the upcoming annual meeting, augmented by a five-rule governance escalation layer (overboarding, audit-committee composition, prior dissent, and others).
Bands map to those probability thresholds:
- Crisis — high probability of vote support below 70%. Rare.
- Material — high probability of below 80%. The primary screening threshold.
- Elevated — significant elevated risk of dissent.
- Watch — even a mild withhold is detectable. Informational.
- Healthy — no signal of meaningful dissent.
Prior is the director’s most-recent vote-support percentage at this same board. Direction compares the forecast to that prior vote: ↑ expected better means more support than last year; ↓ expected worse means less.
Forecast applies only to non-contested annual proxies (DEF 14A). Contested situations are tracked separately on the contested-proxy pipeline. The model is retrained nightly; bands shown reflect the most recent run.
« Back to Shareholder Meeting Calendar
Frequently Asked Questions
Last updated: